Causality is a higher-level mental construct derived from low-level percepts such as contiguity in space-time. We show that low-level spatial perception is distorted by the presence of a causal connection, such that two objects appear closer in space when they are causally linked than when they are not. This finding parallels recent demonstrations of temporal causal binding and suggests that causality is at the root of a general ambiguity-resolution process operating on the human perceptual system.
Einstein's theory of relativity is not often evoked in psychology, despite decades of research demonstrating that human time perception is subject to situation-dependent biases (for overviews, see Eagleman, 2008; Fraisse, 1984) , and despite textbooks full of visual illusions illustrating that space perception is prone to context-induced distortions (e.g., Snowden, Thompson, & Troscianko, 2006) . Perhaps one reason why Einstein's conjectures are not prominent in psychology is that the analogy is imperfect. Whereas for Einstein, the relativity of time and space is conceptually related, visual and temporal illusions in psychology are not. Here we report a new visual illusion-a subjective contraction of space-that bears a 1:1 mapping to a recent, but now well-established, distortion of time perception. We demonstrate that objects forming a causal event sequence appear closer in space relative to objects involved in noncausal sequences. These results correspond perfectly to recent reports of causality-induced time contraction Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, in press) and suggest that the higher-level concept of causality has a profound influence on humans' perception of both space and time.
Causality-Induced Time Compression
Temporal binding of causes to their effects (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Haggard et al., 2002) refers to simultaneous shifts in conscious awareness that result in instrumental actions being perceived as later compared with noninstrumental actions, and in target events resultant from instrumental actions being perceived as earlier relative to control events: Causes and effects mutually attract each other in subjective time. This effect is robust, has been demonstrated with a variety of methods over a considerable interval range, and affects not only event awareness, but also perception of intervals as well as motor planning reliant on it Humphreys & Buehner, in press ). The most comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon so far rests on a bidirectional Bayesian interpretation of Hume's tenets of causality: Contingency and contiguity license causal inference; according to Bayes' theorem, causally related events are therefore more likely than non-causally related events to be contiguous in space and time. Because temporal perception is inherently uncertain, systematic biases arise, leading to causality-induced compressions of subjective time (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002 ). An alternative interpretation relies on forward models of motor command and hypothesizes the formation of associations between instrumental actions and their goals (Haggard et al., 2002) , limiting the phenomenon to intentional actions. Our own research has demonstrated that intentional action is not sufficient to produce temporal binding, and has confirmed that causality is the critical trigger ).
Causal Binding in Space
Causal perception arising from two-dimensional displays that simulate physical "launching" has a long empirical history (Michotte, 1946 (Michotte, /1963 ; its immediate and irresistible nature makes it a good candidate for studying causal binding in space and examining the generalizability of Bayesian causal binding beyond the temporal domain. Scholl and Nakayama (2002) demonstrated that perceptual causality is subject to Bayesian principles of ambiguity reduction: They developed an ambiguous "passing" stimulus, in which the launcher passed (occluded) the launchee; at the moment of full occlusion, the launchee started moving in the same direction. On its own, this stimulus did not elicit impressions of causality, but looked like a noncausal pass. However, when presented in close proximity to an unambiguous launching stimulus, the passing stimulus did elicit impressions of causality. Scholl and Nakayama argued that given the human visual system's tendency to avoid coincidences, the overlap of a causal launch with an ambiguous stimulus is best explained by assuming that the latter must also have been causal. Our goal in this study was to determine whether Bayesian ambiguity reduction in visual perception extends to causal binding in space. We adapted a classic Michottean stimulus involving three objects: a launcher, a launchee, and a rectangle separating the two. In our causal displays, the launcher moved toward and collided with the rectangle; immediately afterward, the launchee began to move in the same direction (Fig. 1) . The size of the rectangle separating the launcher and launchee varied randomly across trials. We expected that if causal binding extends from the temporal to the spatial domain, the subjective size of the rectangle separating cause and effect in space would shrink. We tested this hypothesis by comparing subjective rectangle size in causal displays and various noncausal control displays.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Eighteen Cardiff University undergraduates participated in return for course credit. The 40-min session included both this experiment another one not described here. One participant failed to comply with instructions and was removed prior to analysis.
Materials and apparatus.
All stimuli were presented on a G3 iMAC computer running at 600 MHz. Participants sat at an average viewing distance of about 44 cm without head restraint, so that the display measured approximately 34.1° by 25.6° of visual angle. Experimental trials were presented against a white background. Each animation involved two green circles, the launcher and the launchee (each subtending In causal and delayed launches, the circle on the left, the launcher, moved toward the rectangle; after the moment of contact, the circle on the right, the launchee, began to move in the same direction. In causal launches, the launchee's movement began immediately upon contact, whereas in noncausal launches, its movement began after a 600-ms delay. Upward launches were similar to causal launches except that the launchee moved upward rather than continuing on the same trajectory as the launcher. Priority-violation trials reversed the temporal order of causal launches: The launchee moved to the right, and immediately after it came to a halt, the launcher moved to the right until it collided with the rectangle.
1.4°), and a red bar (subtending 1.4° in height). The bar's length varied randomly across trials within a range from 1.4° to 6.7°, and the bar was always centered in the screen. At the beginning of each trial, the launcher was stationary on the left side of the screen, and the launchee sat immediately adjacent to the right edge of the bar. The launcher then moved smoothly to the right at 19.8° per second until it collided with the left edge of the bar. Depending on whether the trial constituted a causal-or delayed-launch sequence, the launchee commenced moving to the right either at the moment of the launcher's impact with the bar or after a 600-ms delay. The launchee initially traveled at the same speed as the launcher. After a distance of 5.28°, the motion gradually and smoothly slowed down until the launchee came to a standstill. The total distance traveled by both launcher and launchee was 9.9° in each trial. The starting and ending positions of both circles thus were defined relative to the edges of the bar and consequently varied from trial to trial. Figure 1 illustrates the event sequence in each type of trial.
Each trial commenced and ended with an interval during which all stimuli were stationary. For causal launches, this interval was 500 ms; for delayed launches, it was 200 ms, to compensate for the 600-ms delay between impact and launch. Because the circles took the same time period to complete their respective movements in causal and delayed launches, the bar was visible for 1,500 ms in both types of trial.
At the end of each animation, all stimuli were removed, and a probe bar of the same height as the rectangle from the animation was presented centered in the screen. Participants were instructed to adjust the size of the probe (via a mouse-manipulated slider beneath it) so that it matched the size of the bar from the previous animation. Initially, the width of the probe subtended 0.07°.
Design and procedure. Causality was varied within participants. At the beginning of the experiment, participants first observed one causal and one noncausal animation, as well as one example of the response probe. They then proceeded to the 80 experimental trials, which consisted of 40 causal-launch and 40 delayed-launch trials, presented in a random order. The experiment concluded with a manipulation check involving causality judgments of both types of displays. For this task, five causal-launch and five delayed-launch animations were displayed in a random order, and participants had to indicate on a scale from 0 (not at all causal) to 100 (strongly causal) how strongly they felt that the first circle caused the second one to move in each case. The experiment took about 15 min.
Results and discussion
We calculated judgment error for each trial by subtracting the bar's actual length from the length reproduced by the participant. Negative errors thus mean underestimation. Each participant contributed to the analysis a mean error score for causal trials and a mean error score for noncausal trials. Likewise, causal ratings from the manipulation check were averaged for each participant. Figure 2 displays the mean judgment errors for causal and delayed launches. Note that, as in temporal binding research, we were interested in relative, rather than absolute, underestimation. As the figure shows, the size of the bar separating the two objects at the moment of impact was underestimated for causal launches (M = -2.19', or -0.04°) relative to delayed launches (M = 2.46', or 0.04°), t(16) = 2.39, p rep = .91. Moreover, on an individual level, 14 out of 17 participants (82%) made more negative judgment errors for causal than for delayed launches.
Judgment errors.
Our method ensured that the bar indicating the distance between the two circles was displayed on screen for the same amount of time in causal and noncausal displays. We did this to avoid systematic inaccuracies in one condition relative to another. Ironically, this could have introduced a confound that potentially compromises our conclusions. Although the bar was visible for the same amount of time in both types of trials, it was visible for longer with both the launcher and the launchee adjacent to it during noncausal trials (i.e., during the 600-ms delay between impact and launch). If size estimates were derived from an afterimage of the bar with the two objects adjacent to it, this would have led to relative overestimations for noncausal displays. Thus, the difference we found could simply have been driven by lower-level perceptual processes and need not have involved higher-level concepts of causality. We conducted Experiment 2 to rule out this possibility.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 included two additional trial types (see Fig. 1 ). The priority-violation trials reversed the order of motion displayed in causal launches: Trials began with the launchee commencing and completing its movement from the right edge of the bar to the right-hand side of the screen; during this movement, the launcher remained stationary on the left side of the screen. Immediately after the termination of the launchee's movement, the launcher moved until it collided with the bar, at which point it came to a rest. Thus, these trials represented a violation of the temporal priority of cause over effect and consequently should not have elicited any causal impressions whatsoever. The second additional trial type, upward launch, began identically to causal launches, but the launchee moved upward, rather than toward the right-hand side of the screen. Michotte (1946 Michotte ( /1963 reported that such launches elicit weaker causal impressions.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four Cardiff University undergraduates participated in return for course credit. The 30-min session included both this experiment and another one not described here.
Materials and apparatus.
The materials and apparatus were identical to those in Experiment 1 apart from the introduction of the two additional trial types just described. As before, initial and final positions of the launcher and launchee were determined by the bar's length, and the launchee's speed initially was identical to that of the launcher and then slowed down. Both the upward-launch and the priority-violation trials included the same 500-ms stationary period at the beginning and end of the trial as the causal-launch trials.
Design and procedure. The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants completed 160 trials (40 of each type), in a random order, and provided causal ratings for 20 trials (5 of each type) at the end of the experiment. The procedure lasted about 20 min.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check. Causal launches were judged as the most causal (M = 57.99), followed by upward launches (M = 44.06); delayed launches (M = 13.27) and priority violations (M = 3.24) were judged as least causal. Only delayed-launch and priority-violation trials elicited causal impressions significantly below those of causal launches, both ts(23) > 8.0; upward launches failed to produce reliably lower impressions of causality, t(23) = 1.9. Consequently, we did not consider the latter in our analyses of judgment error. Figure 3 displays mean judgment errors for all four trial types and suggests that Experiment 2 replicated the effect of spatial binding during causal collision events. More specifically, bar size was underestimated for causal launches (M = -6.8', or -0.11°), relative to the two noncausal animations (M = -0.007', or -0.41°). Reproduced bar length was significantly shorter in causal launches than in delayed launches, t(23) = 4.83, p rep = .99, as in Experiment 1. Moreover, the effect persisted when causal-launch trials were compared with priority-violation trials, t(23) = 2.77, p rep = .99 which were designed specifically to rule out any low-level perceptual aftereffects that might have compromised our results. In fact, low-level perceptual processes arguably worked against our hypothesis of spatial causal binding in this animation: Whereas causal launches involved a clear display of the bar with a circle on either end (at the moment of impact), priority violations did not. Thus, if judgment error was determined by visual aftereffects alone, priority violations should have given rise to more negative judgment errors than causal launches-the opposite to what we found.
Judgment errors.
The effect was also robust on a per-subject basis. Eleven out of 24 (46%) participants made their most negative errors in this condition, which is significantly above the chance level (25%); 7 participants (29%) made their most negative errors in the upward-launch condition. Priority-violation and delayed-launch trials elicited the most negative error in only 5 (21%) and 1 (4%) participants, respectively.
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Conclusion
The observed causal contraction in collision events adds to a growing body of literature on causal binding. We have shown that causal binding extends to the spatial domain and is not specific to time perception or motor planning. One reviewer queried the validity of the analogy between temporal and spatial binding, given that the bar was visible throughout the entire animation. He or she wondered whether perceptual shifts should therefore have occurred only at the moment of impact. We maintain that, consequently, the systematic relative underestimations evinced after the animations were completed indicate an even stronger effect that persists beyond the instant of collision. Our results also parallel earlier demonstrations of postdictive processes in the perception of causal collisions (e.g., Choi & Scholl, 2006) . In fact, the persistence of the effect despite a retrospective measurement actually strengthens the parallel to temporal binding, which is usually assessed via retrospective magnitude estimation or temporal reproduction (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009, in press ); even the Libet clock method assesses perceptual shifts after the fact (but see Moore & Haggard, 2007 , for evidence of causalityinduced predictive and postdictive shifts in temporal perception). Our findings are significant in two ways: First, the demonstration of spatial causal binding in the absence of intentional motor action is at variance with theories linking binding to the forward model of motor planning and intentional action control. In contrast, this evidence is in line with the suggestion that causality exerts profound biases on the human perceptual system. Second, our findings suggest that causality warps human perception of space-time in line with principles of Bayesian uncertainty reduction (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002) . The human perceptual system apparently resolves lowlevel ambiguities by drawing on higher-level cognitive concepts (causality in this case), which are themselves derived from low-level percepts.
